Author: uobsels

Gray Almasi, 1L Representative, SELS, January 2026

When the Enhanced Games debuts in Las Vegas in May 2026, it will not simply give the world a glimpse into “The Future of Human Performance,” it will test the limits of how far sport can diverge from its traditional regulatory foundations before it ceases to be recognizable as such. Framed as a celebration of “human potential,” the Games will permit international athletes to use performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) during competition, so long as they are approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and administered under medical supervision. Since 2023, Australian entrepreneur, lawyer, and founder of the Enhanced Games, Aron D’Souza, has been luring top-level athletes from across the world with incentives of the total prize money reportedly reaching $25 million, and individual rewards of up to $1 million for record-breaking performances, with the upcoming event positioning itself at the intersection of sport, science, and spectacle.

Yet beyond these incentives lies a far more consequential issue. The Enhanced Games do not merely challenge anti-doping rules; they raise questions about the legal foundations of modern sport. As a result, tensions emerge between private regulation, public law, athlete autonomy, and commercial risk, tensions that could ultimately reshape the global sporting landscape.

A Fundamentally Different Sporting Model

Unlike traditional international competitions, the Enhanced Games do not seek to reform existing sporting structures but rather operate as a parallel system that explicitly rejects the authority of international federations and anti-doping bodies. The Games are expected to feature world-class athletes from fourteen different countries competing in swimming, track, and weightlifting, with events such as freestyle and butterfly races, the 100-metre sprint and hurdles, and the snatch and clean & jerk.

Brought to the media in April 2025, the regulatory division from traditional international sporting events drew attention when Greek swimmer Kristian Gkolomeev broke a 17-year-old 50-metre freestyle record during an Enhanced Games-affiliated event. Organizers asserted that Gkolomeev’s swim took place in a certified North Carolina pool, employing Olympic-standard timing technology and experienced officials. Nevertheless, World Aquatics (WA) has refused to recognize the performance, reaffirming that records achieved under enhanced conditions fall outside the existing regulatory framework.

British sprinter Adam Gemili, for example, has indicated willingness to compete at the Enhanced Games without using performance-enhancing substances. Even though this would comply with the Games’ rules, it would exclude him from the protections and recognition of traditional sporting bodies. This illustrates that simple association with the Enhanced Games, regardless of drug use, results in regulatory exclusion from mainstream competitions. Governing bodies view the event as a private commercial product, not a regulated public competition, regardless of an athlete’s individual choices.

On the other side of this international divide, the Games’ organizers defend their model by reorienting drug regulation away from prohibition and toward health monitoring. Proponents argue that this is a transparent, supervised approach that is safer and more honest than existing anti-doping regimes, which they claim incentivize covert misuse.

Institutional Resistance and the Limits of Antitrust Law

Unsurprisingly, established governing bodies have responded with decisive resistance. In June 2025, World Aquatics announced a blanket ban preventing any swimmer, coach, or official involved with the Enhanced Games from participating in its sanctioned events, regardless of whether they personally engaged in doping. The disapproval of the Games from international sport governing bodies is no secret, with a statement from World Aquatics reading, “The Enhanced Games are not a sporting competition built on universal values like honesty, fairness and equity: they are a circus, building on shortcuts.” Similar opposition has been expressed by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and USA Swimming, each arguing that the Games undermine decades of progress in athlete welfare and competitive integrity.

The Enhanced Games responded by filing an $800 million antitrust lawsuit, alleging that these organizations unlawfully conspired to restrict athlete participation and suppress competition. In late 2025, a U.S. federal judge dismissed the claim, concluding the complaint lacked sufficient evidence of anticompetitive conduct. Organizers were granted leave to amend. The ruling reflects a broader judicial reluctance to interfere with the regulatory autonomy of international sports bodies, especially when restrictions are justified by concerns about athlete safety and integrity.

The dismissal underscores that antitrust law offers little protection when exclusion rests on longstanding governance, rather than clear commercial collusion.

Athlete Autonomy, Consent, and Legal Exposure

A key defence for the Enhanced Games is athlete autonomy. Organizers argue that informed consent and medical supervision provide an ethical, transparent approach to enhancement, contrasting with anti-doping regimes, which they claim promote covert misuse. By making enhancement a monitored health choice rather than a forbidden act, they claim to focus on welfare over punishment.

From a legal perspective, however, consent alone does not protect organizers from liability. Athletes’ voluntary assumption of risk does not prevent organizers from being liable under negligence, occupational safety, or public health law, especially if enhancement protocols cause long-term harm. Unlike traditional doping, which assigns responsibility to individuals and occurs outside institutional oversight, the Enhanced Games’ structured, medically supervised approach could expose event organizers, medical professionals, and corporate partners to legal risks.

This exposure is heightened by current scientific uncertainty surrounding the health effects of performance-enhancing drugs. A study published in May 2025 by the University of Birmingham highlights that evidence on the long-term cardiovascular, reproductive, and cognitive consequences of PED use remains limited and largely observational, with insufficient data to establish reliable dose-response relationships or definitive safety thresholds. While harm-reduction models may monitor biomarkers in the short term, they cannot eliminate the risk of delayed or cumulative harm, particularly where substances are used at supraphysiological levels.

These evidentiary gaps have direct legal consequences. If an athlete suffers serious health outcomes, such as cardiac complications or hormonal dysfunction, organizers could face negligence claims grounded in a failure to adequately warn, a failure to mitigate foreseeable risk, or a breach of the duty of care owed to participants. Crucially, uncertainty in the medical literature does not insulate organizers from liability; it may strengthen arguments that permitting enhancement without robust safety evidence falls below an acceptable standard of care.

Further complications arise under public health and drug laws. Some substances, while approved for therapy, may be off-label for performance, potentially triggering regulatory scrutiny or criminal action, depending on jurisdiction. This risk is more pronounced in international contests where overlapping laws apply.

Taken together, these issues suggest that athlete consent, while central to the Enhanced Games’ ethical narrative, does not eliminate legal risks. By institutionalizing enhancement, the Games may concentrate liability on organizers, turning individual health choices into organizational legal exposure.

Commercial Fallout and Contractual Risk

Competing in the Enhanced Games brings major commercial risks. Many elite athletes’ sponsorship deals include morality or reputation clauses that could be triggered by joining a competition condemned by sport’s major bodies. Even if legal, reputational harm can be grounds for termination.

The same uncertainty impacts broadcasters, sponsors, and insurers. Traditional insurers may avoid backing events that facilitate enhancement, which could raise premiums or limit coverage. This limits broadcasting and partnerships, raising questions about the Games’ long-term financial viability despite headline prize money and high-profile backing.

Intellectual property and data ownership present further challenges. The Games’ focus on performance metrics and medical monitoring raises questions about who owns and can monetize athlete data from enhancement protocols, an issue largely underexplored in sports law.

A Stress Test for Global Sport

Whether the Enhanced Games succeed as a commercial venture remains uncertain. What is already clear, however, is their legal significance. By deliberately operating outside established regulatory frameworks, the Games expose the fragility of the consensus that underpins global sport, one built as much on tradition and voluntary compliance as on enforceable law.

Anti-doping systems have long been justified on the grounds of fairness, safety, and public trust. The Enhanced Games challenge that doctrine, arguing that transparency and medical oversight are preferable to prohibition and punishment. Courts and regulators now face difficult questions: where does athlete autonomy end, and regulatory responsibility begin? How far can private organizers deviate from accepted norms before intervention becomes necessary?

In attempting to redefine elite sport, the Enhanced Games may ultimately redefine the legal boundaries that govern it. Whether they are remembered as a bold innovation or a cautionary tale, their impact on international sport regulations will extend far beyond Las Vegas.

Works Cited

Enhanced US LLC v World Aquatics, World Anti-Doping Agency, and USA Swimming [2025] SDNY (Case 1:25-cv-07096-JMF)

“Enhanced.” Enhanced Games, http://www.enhanced.com/. 

“Enhanced Games Files $800 Million Antitrust Lawsuit against World Aquatics, the World Anti- Doping Agency and USA Swimming – Enhanced.” Enhanced Games, 27 Aug. 2025, http://www.enhanced.com/newsroom/enhanced-games-files-800-million-antitrust-lawsuit-against-world-aquatics-the-world-anti-doping-agency-and-usa-swimming. 

“Enhanced Games Files $800 Million Antitrust Lawsuit against World Aquatics, the World Anti- Doping Agency and USA Swimming – Enhanced.” Enhanced Games, 27 Aug. 2025, http://www.enhanced.com/newsroom/enhanced-games-files-800-million-antitrust-lawsuit-against-world-aquatics-the-world-anti-doping-agency-and-usa-swimming. 

“Enhanced Games Lawsuit against World Aquatics, Wada and USA Swimming Dismissed.” Sport Resolutions, 21 Nov. 2025, http://www.sportresolutions.com/news/enhanced-games-lawsuit-dismissed. 

“Enhanced Games Lawsuit against Sports Bodies Dismissed.” Fox Mandal, 15 Jan. 2026, foxmandal.in/News/enhanced-games-lawsuit-against-sports-bodies-dismissed/. 

Martin Chandler, Ian Boardley, Harm reduction in the Enhanced Games: Can performance enhancing drugs be ‘safe’?, Performance Enhancement & Health, Volume 13, Issue 3, 2025, 100341, ISSN 2211-2669, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.peh.2025.100341. 

Colman, Jonty. “What Are the Enhanced Games?” BBC Sport, BBC, 10 Sept. 2025, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/articles/c1j5w5kgn50o. 

Armstrong, Simon. “Enhanced Games Sprinter Reece Prescod ‘not Taking Drugs’ for Las Vegas Event.” BBC Sport, BBC, 13 Jan. 2026, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/athletics/articles/clygr0llzdeo. 

Henson, Mike. “Enhanced Games: Doped Swimmer Claims 50m Freestyle ‘World Record.’” BBC Sport, BBC, 21 May 2025, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/swimming/articles/c629996lnkro.

By: Khashayar Orumchi

Introduction

Online gambling and influencer promotion have increasingly collided in legally grey territories, raising concerns about consumer protection, regulatory evasion, and the responsibilities of public figures who promote high-risk platforms to their audiences. This article aims to examine a lawsuit that showcases how legally questionable gambling models are being promoted to millions of people through celebrity-driven marketing. Rather than standing alone, this case reflects the current trend of online gambling and crypto-based betting platforms. With this growing trend, we are seeing a rise in legal and policy concerns, and it is through these concerns that we see the Stake.us lawsuit in Missouri.

In the new class-action lawsuit, filed in Jackson County, Missouri, the gambling platform Stake.us, promoted by Drake and Adin Ross, is accused of running an unlicensed online casino through a workaround that allowed users to gamble for real monetary value.

The plaintiffs aim to shut down Stake.us and seek injunctive relief and monetary damages against two of Stake’s biggest promoters, Canadian music artist Drake and streamer and social media influencer Adin Ross. Similar actions have already appeared in states such as New Mexico and California, signalling a growing pattern of litigation targeting influencer-driven gambling platforms.

In exploring the implications of the Missouri case, this article sets out the factual background and the mechanics of the Stake.us model, examines the role of influencers, situates the case within broader industry trends, and analyses the legal and regulatory issues arising from it.

Background of the Case

The class action lawsuit was filed on October 27th in Jackson County, naming Sweepsteaks Limited, Drake, and Adin Ross as co-defendants.

Sweepsteaks Limited operates one of the most profitable online casinos, Stake.com. Stake.com is widely popular globally and sponsors Everton, an English Premier League club, as well as multiple MMA and UFC fighters, and the Formula One racing team Sauber.

Despite its global dominance, Stake.com was unable to expand its platform into the US market due to stringent online gambling regulations in many US states. Stake.us was created to circumvent these restrictions and was marketed as a “social casino,” not a form of actual gambling.

How Stake.us Functions

Stake.us offers two types of virtual currency, Gold Coins and Stake Cash. Users of Stake.us can purchase Gold Coins, which have no real-world value, but purchases of Gold Coins are bundled with a bonus of Stake Cash, which can be gambled with and cashed out as cryptocurrency, thereby gaining real-world value.

The lawsuit alleges that this structure serves as a workaround to U.S. gambling regulations, effectively allowing Stake.us to operate as an unlicensed online casino.

The Role of Influencers

The lawsuit further alleges that Stake.us utilises influential figures, such as Drake and Adin Ross, alongside other marketing tactics, including sponsorships and social media outreach, to disseminate deceptive messaging.

Drake and Adin Ross regularly promote Stake on Instagram and stream their gambling sessions on Kick, a platform owned by Stake’s founders, often showcasing their enormous winnings. The lawsuit alleges that these advertisements are conducted under “deeply fraudulent pretences,” as they often do not gamble with their own money, despite telling the public the opposite.

The lawsuit mentions that Drake’s massive online following, with over 140 million Instagram followers, and calls Drake’s role as “Stake’s unofficial mascot” coercive. The lawsuit further alleges that Stake offers Drake and Ross “house money” so any losses become part of a tactic to draw more attention.

The facts of this case are extensive, and one can spend considerable time examining the lawsuit’s details and the actions of Stake.com, Stake.us, and Kick. However, this article aims to highlight a few key points that emerge from this case, which could potentially alter the current trend of online gambling websites endorsed by prominent athletes, artists, and influencers.

Broader Industry Trends

Online gambling has been a phenomenon for a long time, but we have seen a massive rise in both the usage of online gambling and the advertising of it. This trend has also brought investing apps into online gambling. On August 19, 2025, Robinhood, an investing app, announced a new feature that allowed sports betting on its app. Interestingly, the next day, FanDuel, a sports betting website, partnered with CME to bring stock market gambling to its website. And in October, in a massive move, the New York Stock Exchange’s parent company invested $2 billion in Polymark, a cryptocurrency-based prediction market.

What is fascinating about this trend is that many of these companies use famous and influential figures as their advertisers. Drake, Adin Ross, XQC, Neymar Jr., Cristiano Ronaldo, Michael Phelps, Paris Hilton, and Bruce Buffer are among the famous individuals who collaborate with online gambling companies in some capacity.

The legal dimension

Influencer Liability

A key issue in this case is the scope of influencer liability for allegedly “deceptive” advertising practices. Deceptive advertising laws in the US, governed in part by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), prohibit false or misleading claims about products or services.The lawsuit alleges that Drake and Ross misrepresented their gambling activities by using “house money” to gamble without disclosing it. Given the facts of the case and the clear laws against misleading advertising, Drake and Ross’s actions could be construed as unlawful.

If courts allow claims like this to proceed, it could set a precedent where influencers are expected to conduct due diligence before endorsing a company, especially one operating in legally grey or heavily regulated fields. It may also encourage plaintiffs to target celebrities not only for their role in boosting visibility but for the deceptive nature of the promotions themselves, especially when the influencer’s conduct (e.g., pretending to gamble with their own money) becomes part of the alleged wrongdoing.

Contractual Protections

According to LegalSportsReport, considering Drake acted as Stake’s ambassador, there is a likely chance that his endorsement/ambassador contract could protect him against liability by including standard contractual protections and liability-limiting clauses, such as:

• Grant Endorsement of Rights (allowing the company to use his likeness and promotional content)
• Influencer Services (outlining the duties he must perform)
• Compensation/Free Credits (payment or perks provided for promotion, such as cash or gaming credits)
• Indemnification (shifting liability from the influencer to the company in case of any third-party claim for damages)

Assuming such clauses are in place, naming Drake or Ross as defendants may not result in direct financial relief from them. However, the case could still open the door to a new era in which influencers, artists, and streamers can become entangled in litigation arising from the activities of the companies they promote. Until now, influencer liability has been relatively rare and mainly limited to issues like improper disclosure of sponsorships. But cases like this one signal a shift: when the advertised product deals with gambling, cryptocurrency, or financial speculation, areas already rife with regulation and potential illegality, promoters may increasingly find themselves pulled into legal disputes.

Class Action Considerations

Class action considerations are also relevant. The Missouri case may involve multiple claimants, and courts look to standards such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which requires:

1. Numerosity (sufficiently large group)
2. Commonality (common legal or factual questions)
3. Typicality (claims or defences typical of class members)
4. Adequacy of representation

Missouri has recently aligned its class action rules with federal standards, meaning that certification, common questions of law or fact, and representative adequacy are central to whether such cases can proceed. The Boyle v. Sweepsteaks case illustrates how standing, injury in fact, and the availability of injunctive relief are assessed in online gambling disputes; a plaintiff alleging economic harm and ongoing risk of future injury may have standing to pursue claims akin to a class action, even if not formally certified as one.

The current case in Missouri is brought by Justin Killham on behalf of himself and others in similar situations. While the current class size is unknown, it could include hundreds of Missouri residents who have lost money on Stake.us.

Emerging Legal Landscape / Regulatory Challenges

Part of what makes this case significant is that it sits in a legal realm that is still taking shape. Online gambling, cryptocurrency-based casinos, and sweepstakes models operate in an intersection of laws that vary dramatically from one state to another. Many digital gambling platforms exploit these gaps by branding themselves as “social casinos” or “entertainment-only” services, even when their structure functionally mirrors real gambling.

The rise of crypto adds another layer of complexity. Tracking deposits, winnings, and cash-outs becomes exponentially more difficult when funds move through decentralised networks.Regulators often struggle to keep up, leaving vast portions of the online gambling world unregulated or ambiguously regulated. Courts, too, are only beginning to confront these questions, meaning that many of the legal answers are still in formation. Cases like the one in Missouri may set early guideposts for consumer protection, advertising standards, and the duties of public figures in the online gambling space.

Conclusion

The Stake.us case can be a turning point in how the law treats influencer-driven promotion of high-risk digital products. The role of celebrities and influencers becomes increasingly central and, by extension, scrutinised as online gambling platforms continue to expand faster than regulators can respond. Even if these celebrities are not ultimately found legally liable, the moral implications are harder to ignore. Whether or not Drake or Adin Ross is found legally liable, the lawsuit highlights the growing need for transparency, accountability, and ethical responsibility in an industry built on volatility and persuasion. It may also set early guideposts for courts on consumer protection, advertising standards, and the duties of public figures in online gambling spaces.

Works Cited

‘Detailing class action suit filed in Missouri against Stake US and Drake’ Legal Sports Report https://www.legalsportsreport.com/245486/detailing-class-action-suit-filed-in-missouri-against-stake-us-drake/ accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Drake faces second Stake US lawsuit in New Mexico’ CasinoBeats (30 October 2025) https://casinobeats.com/2025/10/30/drake-second-stakeus-lawsuit-new-mexico/ accessed 6 December 2025.

Wallach Legal, post on X (25 April 2024) https://x.com/WALLACHLEGAL/status/1982973910099325095 accessed 6 December 2025.
(If you want the exact date from the post, I can grab it.)

Conor Murray, ‘Drake, Adin Ross and Stake online casino sued for deceptive online gambling practices’ Forbes (28 October 2025) https://www.forbes.com/… accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Drake and Adin Ross face illegal gambling lawsuit over Stake’ The Fader (28 October 2025) https://www.thefader.com/2025/10/28/drake-adin-ross-stake-illegal-gambling-lawsuit accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Breaking down latest California lawsuit against Stake US and its affiliates’ Legal Sports Report https://www.legalsportsreport.com/240723/breaking-down-latest-california-lawsuit-against-stake-us-and-its-affiliates/accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Los Angeles City Attorney files landmark lawsuit against Stake US and partners’ Gambling Insiderhttps://www.gamblinginsider.com/news/30950/los-angeles-city-attorney-files-landmark-lawsuit-against-stakeus-and-partners accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Polymarket to list on New York Stock Exchange’ Axios (7 October 2025) https://www.axios.com/2025/10/07/polymarket-new-york-stock-exchange accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Stake US review – legal states – New Jersey’ Deadspin https://deadspin.com/sweepstakes-casinos/reviews/stake-us/legal-states/new-jersey/ accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Deliberate deception lawsuit targets Stake and Drake over alleged illegal gambling scheme’ KCTV5 (28 October 2025) https://www.kctv5.com/2025/10/28/deliberate-deception-lawsuit-targets-stake-drake/ accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Online gambling laws’ Fortis Media https://www.fortismedia.com/en/articles/online-gambling-laws/ accessed 6 December 2025.

‘What’s going on with Stake in California and the rest of the US?’ Gambling Insider Magazine https://www.gamblinginsider.com/magazine/1187/whats-going-on-with-stake-in-california-and-the-rest-of-the-usaccessed 6 December 2025.

‘Understanding the rules of the game: legal restrictions on gambling advertising’ Don Turner Legal Team https://www.donturnerlegalteam.com/understanding-the-rules-of-the-game-legal-restrictions-on-gambling-advertising/accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Gambling marketing laws’ Fortis Media https://www.fortismedia.com/en/articles/gambling-marketing-laws/ accessed 6 December 2025.

‘New rules boosting safety and consumer choice’ UK Gambling Commission https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/news/article/new-rules-boosting-safety-and-consumer-choice accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Regulators call for stronger measures against illegal online gambling’ UK Gambling Commission https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/news/article/regulators-call-for-stronger-measures-against-illegal-online-gambling accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23’ Legal Information Institute (Cornell Law School) https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_23 accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Missouri aligns class action rule with federal standards’ Thompson Coburn LLP https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/missouri-aligns-class-action-rule-with-federal-standards/ accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Stake US Casino and Drake named in lawsuit – what’s next?’ PennLive (November 2025) https://www.pennlive.com/sweepstakes-casinos/2025/11/stakeus-casino-and-drake-were-named-in-a-lawsuit-whats-next-for-the-sweepstakes-casino.html accessed 6 December 2025.

‘Sport on steroids: walking the ethical and legal tightrope of the Enhanced Games’ Sports. Legal (July 2025) https://www.sports.legal/2025/07/sport-on-steroids-walking-the-ethical-and-legal-tightrope-of-the-enhanced-games/accessed 6 December 2025.

Legal Sports Report – Sports News Category Page https://www.legalsportsreport.com/category/sports-news/ accessed 6 December 2025.

By Anastasia Stamatakis – Final Year LLB for Graduates, November 2025

This article delves into a fascinating intersection of artistry and law. It examines how the dancers of the New York City Ballet transformed quiet restraint into a powerful negotiation tool.

When Art Meets Advocacy

When the New York City Ballet (NYCB) held its annual Fall Fashion Gala earlier this month, the evening was expected to be a glittering display of elegance, celebrity, and high-value fundraising. Instead, it became a stage for a different kind of performance, one rooted not in choreography, but in contract law. The dancers, represented by the American Guild of Musical Artists (AGMA), fulfilled their primary obligation by performing on stage. Yet they made a pointed decision, they would not walk the red carpet, mingle with donors, or attend the gala dinner that traditionally follows. Their visible absence from the social and fundraising portion of the evening sent a loud message without a word being spoken. It was not a withdrawal from duty, but a strategic assertion of bargaining power.

At the centre of this quiet defiance was a stalled collective bargaining agreement. The dancers contract had expired at the end of August, and negotiations over pay and working conditions had reached an impasse. The dancers faced a moment of rare leverage. In choosing to appear only for the performance, they highlighted the economic value of their talent while withholding their participation in the institution’s public relations machinery. This was a calculated move to put pressure on management without breaching contractual obligations.

A Gala Turned Negotiation Stage

To the casual observer, this might have appeared as a cultural protest. Legally, however, it was a live example of contractual dynamics in motion. A collective bargaining agreement is a contract that governs not only wages, but the expectations of labour, visibility, and performance. When such an agreement expires, both parties continue operating under its term while renegotiation occurs but the equilibrium shifts. The absence of a renewed contract creates uncertainty, and in that uncertainty, leverage can be found.

The fall Fashion Gala, one of NYCB’s most high-profile events, presented the perfect stage for negotiation. By performing, the dancers fulfilled the core function of the event, the artistic product. But by withholding their presence from the social elements that drive donor relationships and institutional prestige, they effectively reminded NYCB leadership, and its donors, that their image is a commodity, not a given.

Bargaining Power and Collective Leverage

What makes this incident particularly striking is the power asymmetry it exposes. Despite being the artistic backbone of the institution, the dancers’ earnings are overshadowed by staggering executive compensation figures. The New York City Ballet, a nonprofit organisation, reported a total of $4,365,987USD in compensation for its executive leadership team in the most recent fiscal year, with individual executives earning salaries up to seven times higher than the company’s top-performing ballerinas. This stark disparity is not merely a matter or inequality, it directly informs the power imbalance in contract negotiations. While the dancers generate the cultural and economic value that sustains the organisation, the disproportionate allocation of revenue toward executive pay highlights why collective action has become an essential bargaining strategy for performers seeking fair contractual terms.

By refusing to attend the gala dinner, the dancers disrupted the institutional narrative without disrupting the performance itself. This aligns with a broader trend seen across entertainment and sports law. Creative talent using selective cooperation as a form of negotiation, without breaching contracts outright. Having established the dancers’ bargaining power, it’s worth examining the strategic tool they used, selective performance. This is a nuanced approach to fulfilling obligations while asserting leverage

Selective Performance: The Power of Showing Up–But Not All the Way

What makes this incident a masterclass in entertainment contract strategy is the use of selective performance. The dancers did not breach their contractual obligations, instead, they complied with the essential requirement, performance on stage, while choosing not to engage in ancillary duties. This form of soft leverage is powerful precisely because it operates within legal bounds. It does not require strike action, overt protest or repudiation of the contract. Instead, it utilises absence in visible spaces to communicate value.

In the entertainment industry, contracts often distinguish between primary duties (the show itself) and secondary or implied duties (press events, red carpets, networking dinners). These secondary obligations, while not always explicit, can hold significant weight in the commercial functioning of an institution. By refusing to attend the gala dinner, the dancers disrupted the institutional narrative without disrupting the performance itself.

Contractual Ambiguity as Legal Battleground

Central to this strategic protest is the role of contractual ambiguity. Were the dancers contractually obligated to attend the dinner or red-carpet events? If those obligations were not expressly stated in the collective bargaining agreement, then choosing not to participate does not constitute breach. This grey area becomes a site of negotiation, one that can be exploited by the party seeking to assert leverage.

This incident demonstrates that what is not written in a contract can be as important as what is written. In entertainment law, clauses related to image rights, promotional appearances, and donor interactions must be drafted with precision. If left vague, they leave room for lawful forms of protest, forms that can shift the balance of power without crossing legal boundaries.

Visibility as Currency in Entertainment Contracts

Dancers, like athletes and actors, operate in markets where visibility is value. Their appearances at galas and red carpets are not merely ceremonial, they are vital to branding, sponsorship, and donor relationships. By withholding their presence, the NYCB dancers exercised control over one of the most valuable commodities in modern entertainment, public image.

This signals a broader shift in contract negotiation within creative sectors. Performers are no longer passive recipients of institutional terms, they are active agents who can strategically deploy their labour and visibility to demand fair treatment. The gala boycott is not just a protest, it is a statement that artistry and labour cannot be separated, and that contractual obligations must reflect the dignity and economic reality of creative work.

For aspiring entertainment lawyers, this boycott offers critical lessons. It illustrates how contract law is not static but performative, shaped by timing, optics, and the strategic choices of those it governs. It challenges the assumption that leverage always lies with management or financial stakeholders. Instead, it demonstrates that the power to perform, or not perform, can be a formidable tool in contract negotiation.

Silent Negotiation Ripples Through Contract Law

As the curtain fell at the Fall Fashion Gala, the audience applauded a flawless performance. What they did not see was the parallel performance unfolding behind the scenes, a carefully calibrated assertion of contractual agency. The dancers’ silent absence from the gala’s social events spoke as clearly as any formal legal notice. It demonstrated that in entertainment law, negotiation is not confined to boardrooms, it can take place in what is not done, as much as in what is performed.

Contract law may be written in clauses and sub-clauses, but in moments like this, it is animated by people, their labour, their dignity, and their resolve. The NYCB dancers did not need to speak to be heard. They let the contract, and their silence, do the talking. The dancers are still in the midst of negotiations, and your voice can make a difference. You can show your support for the dancers by sending a letter directly to the management team of the

New York City Ballet by following this link:

https://nycclc.org/news/take-action-send-letter-new-york-city-ballet-leadership-0

Works Cited

American Guild of Musical Artists.

“An Update on Contract Negotiations at New York City Ballet. ” Musical Artists, 8 Oct. 2025,

https://www.musicalartists.org/an-update-on-contract-negotiations-at-new-york-city-ballet/American Guild of Musical Artists.

“NYCB Artists. ” American Guild of Musical Artists, 8 Oct. 2025, https://www.musicalartists.org/NYCBartists/

Leibert, Emily. “New York City Ballet Dancers Boycotted the Fall Fashion Gala. ” The Cut, Vox Media, 10 Oct. 2025,

https://www.thecut.com/article/new-york-city-ballet-dancers-boycott-fall-fashion-gala.html

Lee, Cherilyn J. “An Interview with AGMA Artists at New York City Ballet: Trading in Glitter for Grit. ” Ballet Herald, 18 Oct. 2025,

https://www.balletherald.com/an-interview-with-agma-artists-at-new-york-city-ballet/#google

“New York City Ballet Inc – Nonprofit Explorer. ” ProPublica, ProPublica Inc., 2024,

https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/132947386

Siegler, Mara. 2025, ala/ “New York City Ballet Dancers Stage Managers Boycott Gala. ” Page Six, 9 Oct.

https://pagesix.com/2025/10/09/society/new-york-city-ballet-dancers-stage-managers-boycott-

By Erin Hospedales – November 2025

In Formula 1, driver contracts are no longer just about who sits in the car; they’re multimillion-pound commercial agreements tied to sponsorships and performance expectations. When those deals break down, the legal fallout can be costly. The current dispute between McLaren Racing and IndyCar champion Alex Palou is an example of how collapsed agreements can affect more than just the driver in the seat. Now before the London High Court, McLaren is seeking £15.43 million in damages following Palou’s refusal to join the Arrow McLaren IndyCar team. Palou instead re-signed with Chip Ganassi Racing, leaving McLaren down a driver and out millions.

At its core, the case relies on classic principles of English contract law: breach, expectation damages and how far losses can be recovered. McLaren now looks to claim damages from the sudden departure, primarily from sponsorships and the cost of replacing Palou on short notice. Although Palou admits breaching his McLaren contract, he argues that the claimed damages are excessive, and his defence will focus on mitigating the amount owed. The court will now have to determine how much of McLaren’s claimed losses were a foreseeable result of Palou’s breach.

How McLaren Calculates Its Losses

Under the principle of expectation interest damages, McLaren can only recover losses from Palou if they were reasonably foreseeable and can be proven. Damages aim to put the claimant in the position they would have been in, had the contract been performed.

With that in mind, McLaren has quantified the financial fallout from Palou’s withdrawal in court.When describing the scale of their losses, McLaren Racing CEO Zak Brown argued that Palou’s sudden switch “rolled a grenade into the room and let it go off”. 

To fill the seat left in IndyCar, McLaren cycled through three different drivers before settling on Nolan Siegel, an expensive reshuffle that forms part of their damages claim. Beyond IndyCar, McLaren’s scramble to fill its Formula 1 reserve driver role saw them promote Pato O’Ward, stretching their salary budget higher than expected. Around £1 million was reportedly lost in salaries alone.

Their largest losses, however, arise from sponsorship. NTT, who were set to be McLaren’s long-term primary IndyCar sponsor, expected publicity from being attached to championship winner Palou’s car. Once it became clear he would not join, McLaren was forced to renegotiate, losing over £5 million in annual fees and even more in Formula 1 commercial arrangements. These unexpected costs form part of McLaren’s £15.43 million damages claim as fallout from Palou’s breach.

What works in McLaren’s favour for this case is the certainty with which UK courts treat commercial agreements. The courts take a market-first approach, focusing on what financial loss can be evidentially proven. Detailed reports of sponsorship shortfalls, salary overspends, and replacement costs give McLaren’s claim a clear basis.

Yet, the £15.43 million figure McLaren claims may test the limits of what is legally recoverable. Under the principle of expectation interest, damages must restore the claimant’s position, not improve it. Any losses that the court finds did not naturally arise from the breach or were not reasonably foreseeable will fall outside compensation. Whether all of McLaren’s damages claim is recoverable will depend on how closely each loss is linked back to Palou and if they were a natural consequence of his breach.

Palou’s Perspective

Palou’s defence focuses on reducing the scale of the claim. He stated that McLaren’s losses from entering sponsorship deals reliant on him were not his responsibility, saying that ‘the only loss that was obvious was me not driving the car.’ His case raises the point of remoteness, which limits recovery to losses that were a foreseeable consequence of the breach or that naturally arose from it.

Palou’s legal team highlights that the sponsorship deal with NTT contained no clauses varying the fees depending on the driver line-up. Because the sponsorship fee didn’t vary with the driver line-up, McLaren may struggle to show that Palou’s absence legally caused this loss, meaning the lost revenue may be viewed as separate from his decision to walk away. If it is found that the revised NTT sponsorship was not significantly connected to Palou, this could undermine a large part of McLaren’s claim. McLaren will therefore need to prove that even without a contractual clause, NTT relied on Palou’s arrival when agreeing to sponsor the team.

Responding to the damages claim, Palou’s legal team stated that the number is “wholly overblown” and effectively offset by current driver Nolan Siegel, who paid for his IndyCar seat with McLaren.

If the court accepts that McLaren’s sponsorship and commercial losses were not directly caused by Palou’s breach, much of the claimed sum could fall outside the scope of recoverable loss. This highlights how English contract law draws a line between foreseeable loss and the regular commercial risks that parties take when contracting. The outcome will depend on whether McLaren can establish a clear link to all their losses, or if Palou’s legal team can successfully break the causal chain tying Palou to the costs. 

Why It Matters

Whether McLaren recovers its full £15.43 million claim, a reduced amount, or nothing at all, the case warns how quickly deals in sport can fall apart once tested in court. Advisers to teams should ensure all agreements are supported by clear documentation that shows reliance, and sports lawyers must draftclauses that define the financial consequences of withdrawal. This will prevent public legal battles like McLaren v Alex Palou, which often take a bitter turn at trial. 

Going forward, as athlete contracts intertwine with sponsorships, balancing a driver’s freedom to make career choices with a team’s need for contractual certainty will only become more difficult. Stronger contractual protections can help maintain this balance, so all parties understand their rights and risks before disputes ever reach the courtroom.

Ultimately, no matter the outcome, McLaren v Alex Palou serves as a worthwhile reminder to all lawyers: winning begins with the contract drafting. 

Works Cited:

Associated Press. IndyCar champ Alex Palou admits breach of contract. ESPN, 27 November 2023. https://www.espn.co.uk/racing/indycar/story/_/id/38991847/indycar-champ-alex-palou-admits-breach-contract 

Halpin, Danny. Alex Palou ‘rolled grenade into room’ when leaving McLaren, court told. London Evening Standard, 7 October 2025. https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/mclaren-zak-brown-indycar-high-court-spanish-b1251710.html

Brittle, Cian. Arrow McLaren to lose primary sponsor NTT Data after 2026 season. BlackBookMotorsport ,11 September 2025. https://www.blackbookmotorsport.com/news/indycar-arrow-mclaren-ntt-data-sponsorship-september-2025/#:~:text=%C3%81lex%20Palou%20was%20supposed%20to,the%20company%20has%20now%20activated.

PA News Agency. McLaren ‘not genuine’ about giving F1 seat, Alex Palou tells High Court. The National, 10 October 2025. https://www.thenational.scot/news/national/25533255.mclaren-not-genuine-giving-f1-seat-alex-palou-tells-high-court/

Blackstock, Elizabeth. Major financial details revealed in $30 million McLaren lawsuit against Alex Palou. PlanetF1, 25 August 2025. https://www.planetf1.com/news/major-financial-details-revealed-in-30-million-mclaren-lawsuit-against-alex-palou

Parke, Callum. McLaren taking former driver ‘to the cleaners’ after contract breach, court told. London Evening Standard, 2 October 2025.

https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/mclaren-lawyers-high-court-london-indianapolis-b1250878.html

Mitchell-Malm, Scott. ‘McLaren’s explosive Palou court case – all you need to know’. The Race, 11 October 2025.https://www.the-race.com/formula-1/lies-about-f1-what-mclaren-palou-court-case-has-revealed-so-far/

Walsh, Fergal. Zak Brown and Alex Palou at odds over McLaren announcement in driver contract case. RacingNews365, 10 October 2025. https://racingnews365.com/zak-brown-and-alex-palou-at-odds-over-mclaren-announcement-in-driver-contract-case#:~:text=Palou%20did%20concede%20that%20he,in%20Barcelona%2C%20Hungary%20and%20Austria.

Image credited to Freepik

By Ollie Harper – October 2025

When Crystal Palace lifted the FA Cup in May 2025, fans dreamed of European nights and a chance to test themselves on the continental stage. Yet just a few months later, those dreams unravelled not on the pitch, but in a courtroom.

On 11 August 2025, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) upheld UEFA’s decision to demote Crystal Palace to the Conference League, finding the club in breach of UEFA’s multi-club ownership (MCO) rules. Nottingham Forest took Palace’s Europa League spot, while Palace were left to face Fredrikstad and Midtjylland in a Conference League play-off.

This decision, though disappointing for fans, has wider implications. It highlights the growing tension between financial investment and sporting integrity, and raises the question of whether UEFA’s regulatory framework can keep up with modern football’s increasingly global, investor-driven ownership models.

What is the Court of Arbitration for Sport?

To understand how Palace ended up here, it’s worth knowing what CAS actually is. Established in 1984, the CAS functions as sport’s independent supreme court, resolving disputes through arbitration (a formal process whose outcomes are legally binding) or mediation (where parties reach an amicable settlement).

CAS hears both commercial disputes (like contracts or transfers) and disciplinary matters (such as doping or governance breaches). It even forms special, temporary tribunals during major events like the Olympics or the World Cup. In this case, it was the final arbiter on UEFA’s decision to enforce its multi-club ownership rules.

What are UEFA’s MCO Rules?

UEFA’s multi-club ownership rules are designed to preserve competition integrity and prevent conflicts of interest. Under Article 5 of UEFA’s Regulations, no individual or entity can exercise “control or decisive influence” over more than one club competing in the same UEFA competition.

“Decisive influence” can include shareholding, board positions, or any indirect power over decision-making within a club. If two clubs under shared ownership both qualify for the same competition, only one is allowed to participate.

The logic is simple – to ensure fairness. UEFA fears that shared ownership could compromise competition, whether through transfer dealings, match strategy, or even subconscious bias.

Facts

Crystal Palace qualified for the Europa League 2025/26 after their remarkable FA Cup triumph over Manchester City. Meanwhile, Olympique Lyonnais (OL) also qualified for the same competition by finishing sixth in Ligue 1.

The complication? Both clubs were linked through Eagle Football Holdings, led by American businessman John Textor. Textor owned approximately 43% of Palace and was also the majority owner of OL.

UEFA gave Palace until 1 March 2025 to demonstrate compliance by restructuring its ownership model. However, Textor did not sell his Palace stake until June, three months too late.

Decision

On 11 July 2025, UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) determined that both clubs had breached the MCO rules by failing to comply with the March deadline. Under Article 5, when such a breach occurs, the club that finishes lower in its domestic league loses its eligibility for that competition.

Because Palace finished 12th in the Premier League, and Lyon finished 6th in Ligue 1, Lyon retained their Europa League place. Palace, instead, were reassigned to the Conference League – UEFA’s third-tier competition.

UEFA’s ruling emphasised that compliance is judged by a fixed assessment date, not by subsequent efforts to restructure. The timing mattered more than intent.

Appeal

Crystal Palace appealed to CAS, arguing that the ownership restructuring was in motion and that UEFA’s interpretation was overly rigid. However, on 11 August 2025, CAS rejected the appeal, finding that John Textor still held decisive influence over both clubs at the relevant date.

CAS concluded that UEFA’s enforcement was proportionate and consistent with its integrity objectives. In short, Palace’s late compliance was not enough to overturn the sanction.

For some, the decision felt harsh – after all, Palace had earned their Europa League spot on sporting merit. But for UEFA and CAS, the principle was clear: the rules must apply equally, regardless of sentiment or circumstance.

Key Takeaway:

The Palace ruling sends a strong message: multi-club ownership is no longer a grey area. UEFA will enforce its regulations strictly, and CAS has shown its willingness to uphold those decisions.

This case underlines the importance of timely compliance. Even minor delays in restructuring ownership can have major consequences. Clubs, investors, and executives must now treat governance as a matter of strategic urgency, not administrative formality.

The broader takeaway is that the legal and regulatory dimensions of football are now as decisive as the tactical ones.

Broader Legal Implications:

From a legal standpoint, UEFA’s MCO rules serve as a safeguard against anti-competitive practices. By preventing clubs with shared ownership from competing in the same competition, UEFA ensures that every match remains free from potential conflicts of interest.

The case also reinforces UEFA’s governance authority. In an era of private equity and multi-club networks – think City Football Group or Red Bull – UEFA’s firm stance signals that even powerful investors must operate within clear limits.

Moreover, CAS’s decision adds legal weight to UEFA’s framework, reinforcing predictability and consistency in sports law. It strengthens the message that compliance deadlines and transparency obligations are not negotiable, and that ownership structures must align with the spirit – not just the letter – of the law.

This may also prompt clubs to reassess how they balance commercial ambition with regulatory risk, especially as football continues to attract cross-border investors.

Ultimately, this decision reflects UEFA’s ongoing effort to safeguard competitive integrity in an increasingly complex football economy. While investment is essential to the sport’s growth, UEFA has drawn a clear line: financial power cannot override fairness.

Yet, this also raises a broader question – can strict ownership regulation keep pace with the globalisation of football? As investors continue to diversify and networks expand, UEFA’s approach will face renewed scrutiny.

For now, Crystal Palace’s demotion stands as a cautionary tale: success on the pitch means little if it’s undermined in the boardroom.

Northridge Law, ‘CAS dismisses appeal by Crystal Palace against UEFA decision regarding non-compliance with multi-club ownership rules’ (Northridge Law, 11 August 2025) https://northridgelaw.com/case-update-cas-dismisses-crystal-palace-appeal/ accessed 12 October 2025

Northridge Law, “Sports Investment Insights: Investing in football: UEFA multi-club ownership rules” (Northridge Law, date unspecified) https://northridgelaw.foleon.com/insights/sports-investment-investing-in-football-uefa-multi-club-ownership-rules/ accessed 12 October 2025

Chris Byfield, ‘Crystal Palace’s Europa League dream over after CAS upholds UEFA’s decision’ (TNT Sports, 11 August 2025) https://www.tntsports.co.uk/football/europa-league/2025-2026/crystal-palace-verdict-uefa-cas-court-arbitration-sport-nottingham-forest_sto23210143/story.shtml accessed 12 October 2025

UEFA, Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2025/26: Article 4 – Admission criteria and procedure (UEFA, 11 September 2025) https://documents.uefa.com/r/Regulations-of-the-UEFA-Champions-League-2025/26/Article-4-Admission-criteria-and-procedure-Online accessed 12 October 2025

Court of Arbitration for Sport, Frequently Asked Questions (CAS) https://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/frequently-asked-questions.html accessed 12 October 2025

TLT LLP, ‘Appointment to Court of Arbitration for Sport’ (TLT, 26 May 2023) https://www.tlt.com/insights-and-events/news/appointment-to-court-of-arbitration-for-sport/ accessed 12 October 2025
BBC Sport, ‘Crystal Palace’s Europa League dream over after CAS upholds UEFA’s decision’ (BBC, 11 August 2025) https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/articles/c1kzzpp04kgo accessed 12 October 2025

Tala Al Falouji, Vice President & Secretary, SELS – October 2025

This article examines two ongoing legal disputes between major players in the sports and wearable technology industry. What is expressed below is solely the opinion of SELS with reference to publicly available information as of October 3, 2025

Strava & Garmin’s Legal Battle 

Marley Dickinson described the legal clash between Strava and Garmin in the Running Magazine as “the strangest running-industry legal battle since the Brooklyn Half Marathon sued the Brooklyn Half”. To get to the bottom of why this legal battle is so ‘strange’, let’s begin by dissecting the commercial connection between Strava and Garmin. 

Strava and Garmin are API partners, meaning that API, a software connection, allows for communication of data from Strava to Garmin and vice versa. As of July 1st, Garmin issued new API developer guidelines, they now required the Garmin logo to appear on every post, graph, image, and sharing card that is linked to a Garmin device. A Strava user who records their activity on a Garmin device will now see their uploaded workout displayed on Strava with Garmin branding attached. If Strava does not comply with this guideline by November 1st, Garmin has threatened to revoke API access, meaning that users recording their activity on a Garmin device will not be able to sync that activity to Strava. It’s obvious Strava pushed back, the guidelines had clear implications for the platform’s identity and user experience. These implications are explained by Marley Dickinson in the Running Magazine, he points to three areas of concern.

Firstly, there are advertising concerns that will follow from the implementation of this guideline. In a statement put out by Matt Salazar on Reddit, Strava’s Chief Product Officer, he claims that Garmin’s logo requirement is “blatant advertising”. He expresses concerns over the guideline turning the platform into a marketing tool, which takes away from its purpose of being a fitness tracker. Secondly, this guideline may easily diminish user experience through using user data to sell ad space, this contradicts Strava’s promise of making the platform a fitness driven space. The third concern that is most noteworthy is privacy and user control, as Matt Salazar put it “If you recorded an activity on your watch, we think that is your data… You should be able to freely upload that data without requiring logos or having it used as an advertisement.” This statement shows that Strava is portraying themselves to value user privacy, and users’ freedom of choice when it comes to their data. The guideline that requires the Garmin branding effectively discloses what device users record their workouts with, this is not information that, according to Strava, should be made public.

The Lawsuit 

Strava proposed “less intrusive attribution” over five months of talks, as mentioned in the Running Magazine. Garmin refused to comply, which led Strava to file a lawsuit in Colorado federal court on September 30th. They are alleging patent infringement and a breach of a 2015 Master Cooperation Agreement. 

The patents at issue here are Strava’s segments and heatmaps. Segments are the route maps that show user times and pace when recording physical activity, and heatmaps are visualizations of the most popular running routes. As for the 2015 Master Cooperation Agreement, fitness-tech guru DC Rainmaker explains the guidelines and the alleged breach. He sets out that under the agreement, Garmin was prohibited from developing competing features outside the scope of Exhibit A, which limited them to using defined “Strava Segments.” Strava now claims that Garmin exceeded these limits by creating its own segments and using Strava’s technology to develop rival features, such as heatmaps. 

Garmin declined to comment, stating that the company “does not discuss pending litigation.” It is generally advisable for parties to refrain from making public statements while legal proceedings are ongoing. However, the Running Magazine points out that Garmin had begun offering heatmap-style features in 2013. This is significant because Strava filed its patent applications in 2014, meaning that Garmin’s use of the heatmaps in 2013 could potentially undermine the novelty of Strava’s patents and, in turn, weaken their enforceability. Therefore, DC Rainmaker expects that Garmin will challenge the validity of Strava’s patents.

Why now?

The elephant in the room here is why has Strava decided to bring a patent infringement lawsuit forward over decade-old innovations? The Running Magazine outlines that this lawsuit may be a tactical move to pressure Garmin to drop its logo demand. It appears that after attempts at “less intrusive attribution” proved ineffective, Strava recognized the need to demonstrate to Garmin that something of real value was at stake. They succeeded in illustrating that because, if the claims advanced, they could affect Garmin’s Forerunner, Fenix, and Epix watch lines, and Edge cycling computers. 

User & Market Response 

Following the lawsuit, Matt Salazar took to Reddit, he explained Strava’s stance and the value that the company places on user enjoyment of the platform and data protection concerns. The backlash was immediate with zero upvotes and 1,400 comments, here is one example:

“As a premium (paid) Strava member I want to be clear that Strava’s only of use to me if (it) works with Garmin. The moment Strava no longer syncs with Garmin connect is the last time I open Strava.”

Matt Evans mentions that Strava would likely lose more users since most users would keep their Garmin device and switch to another app instead. Would you rather cancel your monthly subscription to an app that is being called out for hypocrisy or throw away your $400 watch? Several comments on the Reddit post highlighted what they saw as hypocrisy in the statement. Looking at this quote again, “If you recorded an activity on your watch, we think that is your data….” It is ironic that Strava seems to be concerned with user data and how it should be ‘their data’, following the change in their API in November 2023. Strava claimed ownership over user data uploaded from devices such as Garmin’s, stating that this was done because they were “helping to ensure we continue to uphold high standards of data security and privacy for our users.” Before this change was made, Strava users could decide whether to share data with third parties. Josh Ross highlights that after this change, users had to connect their devices (e.g., Garmin) directly to third party services, bypassing Strava altogether. This removed Strava as an intermediary, raising concerns about weaker oversight and protection of user data. The rhetoric that Salazar attempted to put out about the value that Strava places on data-protection is therefore inconsistent as it previously restricted users’ own data sharing rights. 

Recent Developments 

Strava seemed keen on getting Garmin to drop their logo branding requirement, so much so that they filed a patent infringement lawsuit. However, Gadget & Wearables reported that communication between Strava and developers illustrates that Strava will comply with Garmin’s requirement, “while they don’t agree.” Despite complying with Garmin’s requirement, Strava continues its legal case. Although analysts and the timing of the lawsuit may show that the suit was retaliatory in nature, this may indicate that there is some intention to assert their IP rights as well. Garmin might seem to be in a vulnerable spot, having been hit with another lawsuit from Suunto just days earlier. Two patent infringement suits in one week is far from ideal, but it’s worth noting that Suunto’s claim is entirely unrelated to Strava’s, and it hasn’t drawn nearly as much attention. It appears that Garmin currently holds the dominant position in the eyes of Strava-Garmin users, and Strava is adjusting its approach to reflect that reality. 

Takeaway 

The Strava & Garmin dispute sheds light on the blurred line between collaboration and competition in the fitness tech industry. The dispute began as a disagreement over branding, and then evolved into a multifaceted legal battle that had nothing to do with the branding. Strava complied with the branding requirement that they were so opposed to, but upheld their decision to sue Garmin. From an outside perspective, this seems like it’s about control rather than marketing visibility. 

Garmin’s silence speaks volumes, while Strava’ strategy didn’t seem to work and they were receiving backlash for their assertion that they care about user data protection, Garmin still chose to portray themselves as confident and patient. The biggest takeaway here is that sometimes the emphasis isn’t on who’s right or wrong in the courtroom, but rather about leverage in a marketplace where innovation, data, and user trust are the real currencies.

References

1. Running Magazine (Canada): “Strava explains why they are suing GPS powerhouse Garmin.”
   https://runningmagazine.ca/the-scene/strava-explains-why-they-are-suing-gps-powerhouse-garmin/
   
2. Running Magazine (Canada): “Garmin hit with a second lawsuit in a week.”
   https://runningmagazine.ca/the-scene/garmin-hit-with-a-second-lawsuit-in-a-week/
   
3. Reddit (r/Strava): “Setting the record straight about Garmin” (Statement by Matt Salazar, Strava Chief Product Officer).
   https://www.reddit.com/r/Strava/comments/1nw8u98/setting_the_record_straight_about_garmin/
   
4. Tom’s Guide: “The Garmin vs Strava dispute just took another twist — and it’s good news for Garmin users.”
   https://www.tomsguide.com/wellness/smartwatches/the-garmin-vs-strava-dispute-just-took-another-twist-and-its-good-news-for-garmin-users
   
5. TechRadar: “‘We don’t agree with the extensive branding Garmin is forcing’: Strava breaks silence on the ongoing Garmin dispute and outlines next steps.”
   https://www.techradar.com/health-fitness/we-dont-agree-with-the-extensive-branding-garmin-is-forcing-strava-breaks-silence-on-the-ongoing-garmin-dispute-and-outlines-next-steps
   
6. Velo / Outside Online: “Opinion: Suunto’s lawsuit against Garmin only makes Strava look worse.”
   https://velo.outsideonline.com/road/road-gear/opinion-garmin-strava-lawsuit/
   
7. Cycling News: “Garmin’s legal woes deepen as Suunto also files a lawsuit for patent infringement.”
   https://www.cyclingnews.com/news/garmins-legal-woes-deepen-as-suunto-also-files-a-lawsuit-for-patent-infringement/
   
8. Garmin Rumors: “Suunto v. Garmin: Finnish watchmaker alleges patent infringement across many Garmin models.”
   https://garminrumors.com/suunto-v-garmin-finnish-watchmaker-alleges-patent-infringement-across-many-garmin-models/
   
9. Runner’s World UK: “Suunto sues Garmin.”
   https://www.runnersworld.com/uk/news/a68910686/suunto-sues-garmin/
10. Picture credits to Freepik

By Lucas Paolini, MA, Events Coordinator, SELS – October 2025

This article unpacks the upcoming deals being struck by major music labels and AI platforms. What is expressed below is solely the opinion of SELS with reference to publicly available information as of October 5, 2025

The repercussions of artificial intelligence are no longer hypothetical in the music business—they’re being negotiated into contracts. According to the Financial Times, major labels Universal Music Group (UMG) and Warner Music Group (WMG) are within weeks of landmark licensing agreements with AI companies that would formalise how those firms pay to use music in training and to generate new works. The talks reportedly span start-ups like ElevenLabs, Stability AI, Suno, Udio and Klay Vision, as well as Big Tech platforms including Google and Spotify. While details are fluid, one central aim is to establish a “streaming-style” system so each qualifyingcan use generates a micropayment to rightsholders, supported by attribution technology akin to YouTube’s Content ID.  

Sony Music is also in the mix. While not as close to the finish line as UMG and WMG, Sony has signalled its engagement with companies whose models are “ethically trained” and structured to benefit artists and songwriters, another sign that the major labels are seeking to channel AI’s momentum rather than merely fight it in court.  

Why now? Because AI music is Already Everywhere

The urgency is obvious on the platforms. French streaming platform Deezer said in September that roughly 28% of tracks uploaded daily are now fully AI-generated, a staggering number that illustrates how easily synthetic audio can flood catalogues. Spotify, for its part, disclosed that it removed over 75 million “spammy” tracks in the past 12 months. While not all of those removals were necessarily AI-made, the timing aligns with the surge of generative audio tools and manipulation tactics. This isn’t the industry’s first technology shock. A generation ago, labels were routed by peer-to-peer sharing networks like Napster and LimeWire. One of the defining flashpoints was Metallica v. Napster (2000), a lawsuit that resulted in court injunctions forcing Napster to block unauthorized sharing of Metallica’s catalogue and contributed to the service’s shutdown and eventual bankruptcy proceedings as its assets were sold off. LimeWire was later ordered to shut down in 2010 after a federal ruling found it liable for inducing infringement. Those cases cemented a lesson: ignore the tech wave, and someone else will write the rules.  

The labels appear determined not to repeat the early-2000s missteps. Rather than waiting for chaos to calcify, they’re setting terms before generative music becomes ungovernable. As part of the pending AI deals, the majors are reportedly pressing for attribution and detection systems—think Content ID for training and outputs—so that uses of protected recordings, compositions, or artist likenesses can be identified and monetised at scale.  Unlike the Napster era, where infringement often meant one-to-one copies of existing recordings traded without payment, generative systems can use copyrighted works in training without permission (raising reproduction and derivative-work issues), and generate outputs that may imitate an artist’s voice or the protectable elements of a composition or recording, even if no literal sample is present.

Both raise legal and business questions. In 2024, the major labels (via the Recording Industry Association of America) filed first-of-their-kind lawsuits against Suno and Udio (AI generating music platforms) alleging mass infringement by training on protected sound recordings. Those cases remain active and are widely seen as bellwethers for how U.S. courts will treat music-generation models. Separately, music publishers sued Anthropic over AI regurgitation of song lyrics; a federal judge declined to issue a preliminary injunction in March 2025, but the underlying claims continue. These disputes are the legal backdrop to the current push for licensed solutions.  

The Payment Model Labels Want

If the deals close, expect payment mechanics that borrow from streaming economics. Labels want micropayments triggered by specific uses like training, prompting, or the playback of AI-generated tracks that rely on licensed material or identifiable artist likenesses. To make that work, AI companies would need reliable attribution tech: systems that can detect when a model uses or evokes protected assets and apportion royalties to the right parties. Industry insiders often cite YouTube’s Content ID, which matches user uploads against a database of reference files as the conceptual template, though deploying an equally robust system for model training and synthetic outputs is a harder technical challenge.  

Generative music complicates a second legal front: voice and likeness. Even when an AI-made track doesn’t copy a recording or composition, it can still impersonate a distinctive voice. Law here is evolving quickly. In the United States there is no single federal “right of publicity,” but states are looking to be the catalysts for the regulatory generative AI legal framework. Tennessee’s ELVIS Act, effective July 1, 2024, explicitly protects voice against unauthorized AI cloning, reflecting the state’s music-industry roots. In Washington, the NO FAKES Act has been re-introduced in Congress in 2025 to create a national cause of action for unauthorized digital replicas, though it remains under debate. Europe is going a different route: the EU AI Act imposes transparency and copyright-compliance obligations on general-purpose models, with key provisions for generative AI coming into force during 2025–2026. These regulatory moves are reshaping the incentives for licensing, compliance and product design.  

It’s fair to ask whether AI could drive a collapse akin to the early-2000s. Historically, global recorded-music revenues fell by roughly half from the 1999 peak to the mid-2010s trough before streaming revived growth. Today, however, the commercial environment is different: streaming subscriptions are entrenched, the platform economy is regulated, and labels are moving early to set terms for AI. IFPI data show global recorded-music revenues grew 4.8% in 2024 to about $29.6 billion, the tenth consecutive year of expansion—hardly a collapsing market. That doesn’t mean AI is benign, but it does suggest the business is negotiating from a position of relative strength.  

That said, there are material risks. Catalogue dilution—the flood of low-quality or sound-alike tracks—can make it harder for legitimate releases to be discovered. Fraud and manipulation (fake artists, botted streams, “noise” uploads) siphon royalties from real creators. Spotify’s 75-million “spammy” takedown figure underscores the scale of the hygiene problem that platforms and labels now face. Attribution and enforcement tech will matter at least as much as headline royalty rates.  

What a Sensible AI–Music Settlement Looks Like

A sustainable settlement between labels and AI companies will likely contain four pillars:

Clear licensing lanes: Distinguish between training on recordings/compositions, output uses that reference or reproduce protected elements, and voice/likeness uses. Each lane should carry its own license terms and rates. (This mirrors how sync, master, and publishing are distinct in traditional deals.)  

Attribution infrastructure: A Content-ID-style system that can (a) trace training usage to rightsholders where required by law, (b) detect recognizable protected elements in outputs, and (c) verify consent for voice and likeness replicas.  

Micropayments and revenue integrity: Streaming-like accounting for each qualifying use, with strong anti-fraud controls to avoid the garbage-in/garbage-out dynamic we’ve already seen with synthetic noise uploads.  

Artist choice and control: Opt-in frameworks for voice models and “style” training; easy takedown of deceptive replicas; and transparent disclosures to users when content is AI-generated or voice-cloned. (Elements of this approach are echoed in the EU AI Act and the U.S. NO FAKES proposal.)  

For readers mapping the star system to the corporate acronyms: Taylor Swift releases via Republic Records (a UMG label); Coldplay records for Warner (Atlantic in the U.S., Parlophone in the U.K.); Kendrick Lamar has released through Top Dawg Entertainment with distribution via Interscope (UMG). Those connections help explain why the majors’ stance matters so much: deals struck at the group level set the framework that protects their marquee acts’ recordings, compositions, and their voices.  

From Litigation to Licensing

The courts will still matter. The RIAA’s suits against Suno and Udio (and the publishers’ case against Anthropic) will influence how far fair-use and other defences can stretch in the AI context. But the current wave of licensing talks shows the industry’s preferred endgame: channel AI into licensed, accountable products that compensate creators and preserve trust with listeners. If the majors can lock in attribution and consistent micropayments now, they might avoid a repeat of the Napster era’s value destruction while still leaving space for the creative upsides of new tools. In other words, the question is no longer whether AI belongs in music. It’s how it belongs—and who gets paid when it does.

Works Cited 

‘Music labels close to landmark AI licensing deals’ Financial Times (3 October 2025) https://www.ft.com/content/1a1ae15b-af1a-4daf-8d1f-4c8a7db77865 accessed 5 October 2025.

Reuters, ‘Music labels near AI licensing deals — FT’ (3 October 2025) https://www.reuters.com/world/us/music-labels-near-ai-licensing-deals-ft-2025-10-03/ accessed 5 October 2025.

Murray Stassen, ‘Spotify has deleted 75m+ “spammy tracks” – as it unveils new AI music policies’ Music Business Worldwide (25 September 2025) https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/spotify-has-deleted-75m-spammy-tracks-as-it-unveils-new-ai-music-policies/ accessed 5 October 2025.

The Guardian, ‘Spotify removes 75m spam tracks in past year as AI increases ability to make fake music’ (25 September 2025) https://www.theguardian.com/music/2025/sep/25/spotify-removes-75m-spam-tracks-past-year-ai-increases-ability-make-fake-music accessed 5 October 2025.

The Hollywood Reporter, ‘Spotify Removes 75 Million “Spammy” Songs, Cracks Down on AI Use by “Bad Actors”’ (25 September 2025) https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/business-news/spotify-new-ai-policies-spam-filter-enforcement-1236379926/ accessed 5 October 2025.

Rolling Stone, ‘Spotify Won’t Ban AI Music Under New Rules’ (25 September 2025) https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/spotify-not-banning-ai-music-new-guidelines-1235434946/ accessed 5 October 2025.

Blake Brittain, ‘Music AI startups Suno and Udio slam record label lawsuits in court filings’ Reuters (1 August 2024) https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/music-ai-startups-suno-udio-slam-record-label-lawsuits-court-filings-2024-08-01/ accessed 5 October 2025.

Blake Brittain, ‘US judge declines to block Anthropic from using song lyrics in AI training’ Reuters (28 March 2025) https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-judge-declines-block-anthropic-using-song-lyrics-ai-training-2025-03-28/ accessed 5 October 2025.

Financial Times, ‘Music industry revenues slow as pandemic-era CD boom fades’ (19 March 2025) https://www.ft.com/content/05ea07dc-2fae-4616-93e1-746cc8ac4635 accessed 5 October 2025.

Reuters, ‘Music revenues rise again in 2024, boosted by streaming subscriptions, report shows’ (19 March 2025) https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/music-revenues-rise-again-2024-boosted-by-streaming-subscriptions-report-shows-2025-03-19/ accessed 5 October 2025.

Image credited to FreePik

Alex Nygren, Chair & Founder, SELS – September 2025

This story follows an on-going investigation with the NBA, and as such, more information is being released. What is expressed below is solely the opinion of SELS with reference to publicly available information as of September 29, 2025.

What’s Going On?

In early September, reports surfaced that Kawhi Leonard, one the NBA’s biggest stars, and the Los Angeles Clippers may be  at the centre of a scandal that could reshape how we think about endorsement deals and salary cap enforcement. 

Pablo Torre, a podcaster and former ESPN contributor reported that the Clippers paid Leonard through a company which owner Steve Ballmer had invested heavily in to circumvent the salary cap.

The story starts with Aspiration, a financial services start-up that filed for bankruptcy in March 2025 after its co-founder pleaded guilty to fraud. Clippers owner Steve Ballmer invested roughly $50 million in Aspiration through his personal LLC on September 14, 2021, and another $10 million in March 2023. That same month in 2021, the Clippers announced a $300 million partnership with the company. Minority owner Dennis Wong invested nearly $2 million just days before Leonard received a $1.75 million payment from the company.

Less than a year later, in April 2022, Leonard – through his company KL2 Aspire LLC – signed a four-year, $28 million endorsement contract with Aspiration. The agreement reportedly included a clause making the deal conditional on Leonard remaining a Clipper. Critics argue it was a “no-show” deal, with Leonard performing little or no promotional obligations. Torre claimed that Leonard could also “decline to proceed with any action desired” by Aspiration and continue to be paid. An anonymous employee who purportedly worked for Aspiration told Torre that the payment to Leonard “was to circumvent the salary cap.” Former Aspiration CEO Andre Cherny disputes this, claiming the contract had “three pages of extensive obligations” and could be terminated for non-performance.

So why does this matter? Because if true, it could mean that the deal was a vehicle to funnel money to Leonard outside of his official NBA salary – and end-run around the league’s salary cap rules. The NBA has now launched a formal investigation, retaining Watchell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to determine if the Clippers and Leonard broke the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 

This is not just about one player or one team. It raises fundamental legal questions about contracts, regulatory enforcement, and the governance of professional sports. 

Background: What Was Aspiration?

Aspiration was co-founded in 2013, by entrepreneur and Harvard alumni Joe Sanberg, and Andrei Cherny, a lawyer and former speechwriter for the Clinton administration. The company’s goal was to provide “socially-conscious and sustainable banking services and investment products” with their slogan being: “Do Well. Do Good”. 

Aspiration positioned itself as an eco-friendly alternative to traditional banks. The company promoted itself as different from mainstream financial institutions by pledging that customer deposits would never be used to finance fossil fuel projects such as pipelines, oil rigs, or coal mines. 

The Legal Framework 

The NBA’s CBA prohibits teams and their affiliates from providing or arranging extra compensation to players outside of their official contracts. Specifically, endorsement or sponsorship deals are problematic if:

1. The compensation is far above fair market for the services provided. 
2. The contract is tied directly or indirectly to the player’s continued service with the team.
3. There is an “understanding” that the deal is substituted for salary.

If proven, penalties can include substantial fines, loss of draft picks, and contract voiding.

Historical Precedent 

The closest parallel is the Joe Smith case (1999), where Smith signed a series of one-year deals for below-market value, which was a secret agreement to allow the Timberwolves to exceed the salary cap and retain his “Bird Rights” for a larger future contract, enabling them to sign other players. The league discovered the scheme, resulting in severe penalties for the Timberwolves, including the loss of draft picks and a large fine, as well as Smith being declared a free agent. 

Legal Issues in Focus 

1. Endorsement or Disguised Salary?
   • If Leonard’s duties were nominal or unenforced, the contract may fail as a genuine endorsement. Regulators often apply a substance-over-form test.
2. Conditionality
   • A clause voiding the deal if Leonard left the Clippers directly ties compensation to team service, raising red flags under the CBA.
3. Owner Investments 
   • Ballmer’s and Wong’s investments, especially when timed near payments to Leonard, may show a casual link between ownership financing and player compensation. 
4. Performance & Enforceability 
   • If obligations existed only on paper, the contract could be deemed illusory consideration, supporting the “no-show” allegation. 
5. Burden of Proof 
   • Commissioner Adam Silver has stressed that penalties require more than bad optics – the NBA must prove intent or effect (though the CBA gives the commissioner broad discretion).

Possible Outcomes

Under the NBA’s circumvention rules of the 2023 CBA, teams can be punished for circumventing the league’s salary cap. Penalties can range from fines of up to $7.5 million, forfeiture of draft picks, voiding player contracts as well as a suspension of up to a year for any team personnel found to be engaged in the violation.

Why It Matters 

This controversy goes beyond one player or one team. It illustrates the blurred line between endorsement contracts and salary compensation, the risks of ownership investment in player sponsors, and broader lessons in contract law (illusory obligations, conditionality), as well as sports governance – how far can regulators go to preserve integrity?

Responses & Denials 

According to the Clippers: “Neither Mr. Ballmer nor the Clippers circumvented the salary cap or engaged in misconduct related to Aspiration.” 

“…Any contrary assertion is provably false: The team ended its relationship with Aspiration years ago, during the 2022-23 season, when Aspiration defaulted on its obligations. Neither the Clippers nor Mr. Ballmer was aware of any improper activity by Aspiration or its co-founder until the government instituted an investigation. The team and Mr. Ballmer stand ready to assist law enforcement in any way they can.” 

The Clippers went on to say in a second statement that “The notion that Steve invested in Aspiration in order to funnel money to Kawhi Leonard is absurd.” “… There is nothing unusual or untoward about team sponsors doing endorsement deals with players on the same team. Neither Steve nor the Clippers organization had any oversight of Kawhi’s independent endorsement agreement with Aspiration. To say otherwise is flat-out wrong.”

After almost a month since the controversy first broke, Kawhi himself spoke on the matter stating that he doesn’t “think it’s accurate” that he performed no services for Aspiration. Leonard went on to say “I understand the full contract and the services that I had to do. I don’t deal with the conspiracies or the clickbait analysts or journalism that’s going on.”

Conclusion 

The Kawhi Leonard Aspiration scandal is a high-stakes collision of law, business and sport. With Ballmer’s investments, the conditional “no show” endorsement, and the NBA’s looming investigation, the case is more than a headline: it is a test of the salary cap’s integrity. 

Regardless of whether the league finds misconduct or not, the scandal is already reshaping the conversation around endorsements, ownership and transparency in professional sports. 

Works Cited 

Collective Bargaining Agreement (NBA 2023). National Basketball Association, June 2023. https://ak-static.cms.nba.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2023/06/2023-NBA-Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf

Holmes, Baxter. Report: Clippers skirted NBA salary cap with Kawhi Leonard payment. ESPN, 3 September 2025. https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/46146871/report-clippers-skirted-nba-salary-cap-kawhi-leonard-payment

Holmes, Baxter. Ex-Aspiration CEO denies Kawhi Leonard signed ‘no-show’ deal. ESPN, 10 September 2025. https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/46241767/ex-aspiration-ceo-denies-kawhi-leonard-signed-no-show-deal

Holmes, Baxter. What is Aspiration, the company behind Kawhi Leonard and Steve Ballmer’s Clippers controversy? ESPN, 11 September 2025. https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/46242361/aspiration-company-kawhi-leonard-steve-ballmer-la-clippers

Shelburne, Romona. Kawhi Leonard says allegations of no-show deal not accurate. ESPN, 29 September 2025. https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/46426053/kawhi-leonard-says-allegations-no-show-deal-not-accurate

Toporek, Bryan. Kawhi Leonard circumvention scandal has leaguewide ramifications for NBA. Forbes, 17 September 2025. https://www.forbes.com/sites/bryantoporek/2025/09/17/kawhi-leonard-circumvention-scandal-has-leaguewide-ramifications-for-nba/

Torre, Pablo. The Richest Owner, the Silent Superstar, and the Rotten Apple Tree: A PTFO Investigation. Pablo Torre Finds Out, Meadowlark Media, 3 September 2025. https://www.pablo.show/p/the-richest-owner-the-silent-superstar

Vardon, Joe, and Sam Amick. Kawhi Leonard, Clippers used endorsement deal to ‘circumvent’ NBA salary cap: Report. The New York Times/The Athletic, 16 September 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6629202/2025/09/16/kawhi-leonard-nba-clippers-endorsement-contract/